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Some [New] Elementary Axioms 
for an American Cultural] Studies 
Jay Mechling 
In Memory of Gene Wise 
With great affection for his memory, I have borrowed the title of Gene Wise's 
1979 essay; put simply, the title embodies the "pragmatic attitude" I admire.1 
Gene was an interdisciplinary intellectual historian, among other things, and by 
1979 he was well on his way to writing the definitive intellectual history of the 
American Studies movement. Appearing the same year as the "Elementary 
Axioms" essay was a special issue of the American Quarterly taking the thirtieth 
anniversary of the founding of the journal as the occasion for a retrospective on 
the movement. Although the Bibliography Subcommittee of the American 
Studies Association was the officiai convenor of the issue, the plan was all 
Gene's, and the centerpiece of that issue is his essay, "'Paradigm Dramas' in 
American Studies: A Cultural and Institutional History of the Movement."2 The 
"Elementary Axioms" essay also presents some history, but the mood of the essay 
is more pragmatic. The essay offers, he explains, "a series of elementary 
propositions or working 'axioms,' which for me make possible an interdiscipinary 
culture studies." Wise did not see his list as "the necessary axioms for an entire 
movement. " "I believe we in American Studies," he wrote, "should make our 
working assumptions visible and communicable, and these are mine." He 
presents the axioms "in brief, dogmatic form," not because they are the last word 
but "to prod and generate dialogue." Moreover, he makes it clear that his is a 
"working set of axioms, offered in an experimental spirit. A reflexive American 
Studies does not need a checklist of unexamined commandments, rather, it needs 
working goals to try out and inspect and continually revise over time."3 
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So I am bold enough to propose a revised set of axioms for the late 1990s, 
playing now with Wise's title by turning "Culture Studies" into "Cultural] 
Studies" and reflecting, thereby, on the ways American Studies might dance with 
her interdisciplinary sister field, Cultural Studies. Following Wise's advice, I 
offer these axioms as a sketch of my working assumptions and as an invitation to 
a conversation among American Studies scholars and teachers about our prac-
tices. Before presenting the axioms, though, I want to discuss briefly a little bit 
of history. 
A Little Bit of History 
This essay is not a history of Cultural Studies; the reader can find various 
versions of that history elsewhere.4 Nor do I care much for arguing whether 
cultural studies represents anything new. Intellectuals operate in a system, in a 
nexus of practices, every bit as capitalistic as others in the new professional class.5 
To prove value we need to claim difference, so it is entirely expected that 
disciplines and interdisciplinary fields and individuals within disciplines and 
fields engage endlessly in claims they are doing something new and different. 
At its birth in the 1930s, American Studies really was doing something new 
and different. Although much of its politics through the 1940s and 1950s were 
what we would now call conservative, the American Studies "movement" 
nonetheless practiced a critique of the structures for the creation and reproduction 
of academic knowledge. We should remember that it was within the rather 
illegitimate American Studies that some of the first American women's studies 
scholarship and teaching found a home.6 American Studies departments and 
programs began teaching ethnic studies far before history and literature depart-
ments.7 Ray Browne used the second meeting of the American Studies Associa-
tion in Toledo in 1969 to launch what was to become the Popular Culture 
Association, and otherwise American Studies departments and programs were 
teaching popular, mass-mediated culture far in advance of other departments. 
Richard Dorson, in many ways the entrepreneurial "father" of American folklore 
studies, received one of the first Ph.D.s in American Civilization from Harvard, 
and the presence of a distinguished Department of Folklore and Folklife at the 
University of Pennsylvania meant that a number of Penn American Civilization 
graduate students were able to incorporate folklore studies into their coursework.8 
One sort of identity crisis for American Studies began in the late 1960s, when 
the emerging specialities of ethnic studies and women's studies spun off to create 
their own journals and academic departments and programs and when the 
scholarly practices and teaching in departments of history and literature began to 
resemble those in American Studies. There was a distinct danger that American 
Studies would be defined by what remained behind. At the same time, by the mid-
1970s members of the Connections Collective (formerly the Radical Caucus) 
and, later, of the Women's Committee of the American Studies Association were 
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being elected to seats on the ASA Council and, eventually, were being elected 
presidents of the association.9 The friendly umbrella of the American Studies 
movement, after some lean years, began to attract a diverse community of senior 
and junior scholars and teachers, though at each annual meeting one still hears 
hallway and cocktail party talk about what really distinguishes American Studies 
from the interdisciplinary work done elsewhere by Americanists. This search for 
identity is very American. 
All this while, there was a cadre of American Studies departments and 
programs aiming to put the culture concept at the center of "doing" American 
Studies. What distinguished the American Civilization Department at the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania from the 1950s on was the project of Anthony N.B. Garvan 
and Murray G. Murphey to incorporate the social sciences into American Studies, 
which in this case meant borrowing mainly from anthropology, but also from 
social psychology.10 Penn graduates carried this project to all corners of the 
United States, and in some respects, to international sites, as well.11 
The three University of Minnesota American Studies Ph.D.s (Robert Merideth, 
Brom Weber, and David Wilson) who were the core faculty the American Studies 
Program at UC Davis hired me right out of graduate school in 1971 specifically, 
I understood, because I represented "the Penn approach." As we hammered out 
a new curriculum during 1971-72, we used the occasion to write an essay 
describing our assessment of where American Studies had been and where it 
needed to go. I must let others speak to the impact of that 1973 essay, "American 
Culture Studies: The Discipline and the Curriculum," but it has been a constant 
source of embarassment that others picked up the name while we never changed 
the name at UC Davis.12 In any case, this was the state of affairs when Gene Wise 
wrote the two 1979 essays, the "Paradigm Dramas" essay in the AQ and the 
"Axioms" essay in Prospects. He was trying to advance the notion that the culture 
concept needed to be at the center of American Studies. 
The question by the end of the 1980s, of course, was whether the arrival and 
success of "cultural studies" in American universities was good news or bad news 
for American Studies. I realize that in some institutional settings the news has 
been bad, that advocates of cultural studies from departments of literature, 
history, communications, and elswhere have approached deans with the "news" 
that American Studies is old fashioned or, the worse canard, that American 
Studies pays no attention to gender, race, class, or sexual orientation, and that by 
these arguments the advocates of cultural studies sometimes have made success-
ful claims on resources that might otherwise have gone to American Studies 
programs. I can only say, thankfully, that at UC Davis the scenario seems to be 
different, that the discussion about proposals for graduate and undergraduate 
programs in cultural studies have been cooperative across disciplines and 
interdisciplinary programs. So I tend to see the success of cultural studies as a 
benefit to American Studies. Still, I see some shortcomings in cultural studies that 
can be addressed by American Studies practitioners so as to make for a powerful, 
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interdisciplinary American Cultural Studies. Let me discuss these briefly before 
presenting my new axioms. 
The Poverty of Cultural Studies13 
Cultural Studies, as currently practiced, tends to have impoverished under-
standings (or undertheorized versions) of several key concepts, among them 
"culture," "history," "discourse," and "class." First, it is odd that the culture 
concept, so central to cultural studies, slips by undefined in most cultural studies 
scholarship. The British cultural studies coming out of the Birmingham Centre 
for Contemporary Cultural Studies (founded in 1964) seems to depend most upon 
Raymond Williams's work. While I find Williams's work very valuable, espe-
cially in its lesson about the importance of historical depth in doing cultural 
studies, even his Keywords entry on "culture" settles on a very general notion of 
the concept.14 Williams helps us see the relationship between symbolic and 
material aspects of everyday lives, making problematic the old marxian notion of 
the relationship between base and superstructure, but I think we need a more 
specific way to conceptualize culture. It is not that I think all scholars in American 
cultural studies need to agree to the same understanding of culture; such 
consensus would be a sign of trouble. But I think an author owes it to the reader 
to say as plainly as possible what understanding of the structures and dynamics 
of culture underlies the cultural criticism we are reading. 
Second, a good deal of heated debate over cultural studies has been over the 
field's underdeveloped notion of history. The rise of cultural studies has hap-
pened at the same time that historians have been debating the effects of 
poststructuralism on the practice of historical scholarship, and the two move-
ments and their debates have criss-crossed several times.15 At stake is the nature 
of historical knowledge and the relative privilege of historical narratives as texts 
for contextualizing other texts. 
Without recounting this debate, I want to say simply that by my reading, most 
books and essays doing contemporary American Cultural Studies could benefit 
from a greater familiarity with American history. More precisely, I would say that 
the historians doing cultural history are producing better work than are the critics 
doing contemporary cultural studies. This is still a terribly broad generalization, 
and there are cultural studies scholars doing solid historical work. But I can point 
to one example that stands for others. Douglas Kellner's 1995 book, Media 
Culture, offers a number of provocative interpretations ("figurai analysis," as he 
calls it) of media cultural texts, including Madonna, Poltergist, the Gulf War, and 
Cyberpunk.16 But Richard Slotkin's Gunfighter Nation provides, in my view, a 
much better map of the historial contexts for the sort of mass-mediated narratives 
both Kellner and Slotkin examine.17 Slotkin's historical depth permits him to 
speak about change over time, about the continuities and discontinuities in the 
"myth" of the frontier and how that myth "thinks itself as we Americans come 
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to consider a "text" like the Gulf War, whereas Kellner's analysis seems much 
more synchronic than diachronic. Many otherwise strong cultural studies texts 
could use a good dose of history. 
Third, cultural studies too often has an inadequate understanding of dis-
course. Most cultural studies scholarship privileges printed discourse or treats 
visual discourse as if it were print. Absent is an understanding of the dynamics of 
oral cultures and of the relationships between oral and visual discourse, under-
standings of the sort offered by folklorists and sociolinguists and by some 
rhetoricians. I came to folklore studies after my training in American Studies, and 
reading in folklore helped me understand the primacy of oral discourse in human 
experience. Some folklorists are working in cultural studies, trying to show their 
colleagues what the theories and methods of folklore might contribute to cultural 
studies, but most scholars in cultural studies are oblivious to the work of 
folklorists.181 cannot imagine understanding the poetics and politics of American 
popular culture without understanding the relationship between that mediated 
discourse and the oral and material discourses of everyday life; yet, most cultural 
studies critics do exactly that.19 
Finally, cultural studies offers American Studies an inadequate understand-
ing of social class. An instructive text in this regard is Douglas E. Foley's 
Learning Capitalist Culture: Deep in the Heart ofTejas.20 Half of Foley's book 
tells an interesting ethnographic tale about the racial, class, and gender politics of 
a small town in South Texas, with a focus on the high school and on the ways 
Anglo and Mexicano adolescents of both the working and middle classes 
construct and perform their identities. The other half of the book, however, 
consists of two appendices in which Foley works through the inadequacies of Paul 
Willis's classic cultural studies book, Learning to Labor.21 Put simply, Foley 
finds that Willis's understanding of the dynamics of social class, which might 
work well for analyzing British society, does not work as well when trying to 
understand "class" in the American setting. Instead, Foley combines the insights 
of Habermas and Erving Goffman to construct a "performance view of class 
reproduction and resistance in schools." Foley's experience matches those of 
many in American Studies, I believe, who find that importing the understandings 
of class as developed by cultural studies scholars in Europe simply does not seem 
to work on the American materials. Among other things, race intersects class in 
some possibly unique ways in the American case. But possibly more importantly, 
the United States has the most advanced case of a culture forged by commodity 
capitalism. The students' choice of the term "lifestyle" over "class" may be more 
than false consciousness; they might be on to something.22 
Actually, one of the central voices in cultural studies, John Fiske, makes this 
point very well in his 1993 book, Power Plays, Power Works. In a chapter entitled 
"U.S. Cultures, European Theories," Fiske notes that the European theories that 
best make the transition to analyzing the case of the United States are those, like 
Gramsci's, that abandon "class" as a category and substitute a more fluid notion 
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of "the bloc" or "the power bloc."23 Fiske adds that it is the historically unique 
experience the United States had with slavery and with immigration that helps 
make more complex the ways race replaces class as a salient category in 
determining who sees themselves as belonging to what power blocs in what 
circumstances. For Fiske, Gramsci's key notions of "resistance" and "consent" 
must take into account the historically distinctive ways capitalism developed hi 
the United States.24 
In naming these four undertheorized concepts in cultural studies—culture 
history, discourse, and class—I am hoping that an American Studies that move 
in the direction of an American Cultural Studies will do the necessary theorizing 
The Americanness of American [Cultural] Studies 
Our minds thus grow in spots; and like grease-spots, the 
spots spread. But we let them spread as little as possible: 
we keep unaltered as much of our old knowledge, as 
many of our old prejudices and beliefs, as we can. We 
patch and tinker more than we renew. The novelty soaks 
in; it stains the ancient mass; but it is also tinged by 
what absorbs it. Our past apperceives and co-operates; 
and in the new equilibrium in which each step forward in 
the process of learning terminates, it happens seldom that 
the new fact is added raw. More usually it is embedded 
cooked, as one might say, or stewed down in the sauce 
of the old. 
—William James25 
Continuing my trend of "sampling" (the polite, postmodern, hiphop way of 
saying "appropriating") other scholars' titles, I borrow here from Robert 
Berkhofer's astute essay in the 1979 anniversary issue of the AQ.26 Berkhofer 
notes how "American" is the American Studies movement in the rhetoric of its 
own history and of its practices within the academy, a rhetoric filled with the 
"innocence, nostalgia, confidence, mission, and exceptionalism" historians and 
other culture critics have noted in American discourse. Look at how Europeans 
and others describe Americans, advises Berkhofer, and you will recognize the 
language disciplinary colleagues have used to describe American Studies. 
As a social movement, American Studies bears the same relationship to 
American culture as do other social movements, especially the sort anthropol< 
gist Anthony F.C. Wallace calls "revitalization movements."27 Which is to sa 
that the critique American Studies directs at the academy and at the large 
culture—a critique that changes a bit over time but that consistently argues fc 
wholes over parts, for the continuities of experience, for the value of reflexiv 
knowledge, and so on—comes very much from some basic values one can fin 
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in the culture. The American Studies movement resists both the modernization of 
consciousness and the postmodern logic, the former for its compartmentalization 
of knowledge and its separation of ends and means, the latter for its tendency to 
surrender normative judgment in a plural world. One of the dangers facing 
revitalization movements also faces American Studies, namely, that with some 
success and institutionalization the critique becomes stale and forgotten and the 
movement comes to resemble the institutions it originally defined itself against. 
We can ask Berkhofer's question again, only this time of American Cultural 
Studies. How "American" is this variant, and does that matter? 
American Cultural Studies, ironically, is very American in its embrace of 
Continental and British theory. John Kouwenhoven's 1948 The Arts on Modern 
American Civilization, itself a rich text reflecting late 1940s American culture, 
describes the inferiority complex Americans felt in the nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, failing to understand the uniqueness and quality of their own 
"vernacular style" in contrast with the high styles of European literature, art, 
architecture, and music.28 American Studies was born in English, history, and art 
departments where American texts were still barely legitimate for scholarly 
study. 
The jingoism of myth/symbol/image American Studies notwithstanding, 
that inferiority complex has never gone away. Its newest manifestation lies in the 
borrowing of Continental and British theory as the foundation for American 
Cultural Studies. This is very American, at least among academics. In an e-mail 
exchange among colleagues responding to the draft of a plan for a graduate group 
in Cultural Studies at my university, a friend in the French Department opined that 
Critical Theory had to be at the heart of a Cultural Studies graduate program, lest 
it become a "cheap" degree for students trying to avoid difficult (i.e., French) 
theory. In his view, American Cultural Studies had no philosophical foundation; 
hence, it was shallow and unsophisticated. 
So pervasive is this view of the intellectual superiority of European philoso-
phy and theory over American philosophy and theory that many scholars in 
American Cultural Studies feel obliged to look to Europe for their foundations. 
Working out of Foucault or Lyotard or Stuart Hall legitimates the activity to the 
primary audience of the scholarship. Even John Fiske, whose chapter on "U.S. 
Cultures, European Theories" I mentioned approvingly above, lands on a com-
bination of Gramsci, Foucault, Bourdieu, de Certeau, and Bakhtin as the theoreti-
cal ground from which he launches his analysis of American texts. 
Unfashionable and politically embarassing as it may be, I want to argue for 
a sort of American exceptionalism. The "American case" is exceptional in the 
same way that any national culture is unique; if I were a Cuban scholar doing 
Cuban cultural studies, I would argue for Cuban exceptionalism. I understand 
how problematic is the marker "American"; indeed, a fruitful conversation 
beginning in American Studies is what sense we can make of using the nation-
state as a unit of cultural analysis in a world increasingly dominated by transnational 
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institutions and practices.29 Still, I prefer using the marker, "American," all the 
while suspending it in problematic space. 
American culture is exceptional in that its culture is the unique product of 
natural and historical events. A syncretic system always in flux, American culture 
still has highly probable patterns across time and space, "probable" in the sense 
that each of us lives his or her everyday life predicting and counting on those 
probable patterns (and thrown into puzzlement or anomic terror when the 
unpredicted happens). 
Given this "American exceptionalism," I am prepared to offer the following 
axiom, one so controversial (I imagine) that I dare not include it in the more easily 
accepted and refined axioms I shall discuss below. Stated dogmatically, here it is: 
AMERICAN THEORIES OF AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
ARE TO BE PREFERRED TO THEORIES DERIVED FROM 
EXPERIENCES IN OTHER SOCIETIES. 
I have used the "to be preferred" language so as to keep open the method-
ological strategy of "principled opportunism" (as Henry Nash Smith called it) so 
central to the very pragmatic American Studies style of borrowing ideas and 
approaches from other disciplines.30 Binary oppositions and forced choices 
between the options do not work well in the practice of culture criticism, so I'll 
never say "never" use theories from outside American experience. My principle 
here is that the American theorist has a "map" of a portion of the larger system; 
therefore, the American theorist understands the system in a way a person who 
has not learned the system cannot duplicate. The knowledge of the native is "tacit 
knowledge," knowledge that must be made explicit. This is the native's challenge 
of "reflexive" American cultural studies, of making problematic the commonsense, 
taken-for-granted, "natural attitude" toward everyday life.31 If the native's 
challenge is "to make the familiar strange," then the non-native's challenge is "to 
make the strange familiar." The non-native (let's say the "stranger") has certain 
advantages in not sharing the native's common sense, but without a cognitive map 
that connects somehow with the culture larger than the individual's immediate 
knowledge, the stranger needs some starting point. The stranger brings her own 
experiences to the interpretive encounter, but part of the challenge is to shed that 
commonsense, taken-for-granted, natural attitude. 
This talk of natives and strangers creates a neat dichotomy that crumbles in 
practice, and in several ways. First, by dint of my understanding of culture (see 
below), "native" and "stranger" are terms entirely relative to the frame being 
examined. Everyone is a stranger to my personal, private culture. I am a "native" 
in my mind, in my marriage, in my family, in my friendship groups, in the 
landscapes and bureaucracies I inhabit, in my moments of televisual delight 
watching "The X Files," and so on. I am reminded of this every time I try to 
explain to a person who otherwise looks like a "native" that baseball is not 
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"boring" and that the film Fargo is "funny." This point may seem obvious 
enough, but it challenges me to think about what "counts" as a "native theory." 
For example, American theorists sometimes use European (mostly) ideas in 
constructing their theories or philosophies. How can I draw a neat line between 
"American" and "other" theorists? I cannot, but I can argue that the European 
theory, for example (I am being very Eurocentric here, I know), becomes 
American when "cooked," as William James puts it, in the juices of American 
experience. Freudian theory becomes a new and powerful tool for understanding 
American culture in the hands of a Karen Horney or an Erik Erikson or a 
Christopher Lasch or a Nancy Chodorow.32 Richard Rorty assembles his brand of 
neopragmatism mainly out of American pragmatic thinking, but he borrows (as 
a pragmatist would) some elements from European philosophers and processes 
those ideas through the principles of the pragmatism. A version of my axiom 
would avoid the Eurocentrism of this discussion by looking to the ways other 
philosophies get into American theory. For example, the notion of a "black 
sociology" poised against "the Eurocentric sociology of the experience of 
African people in America" might provide better theory for understanding 
African American experience. 
A second problem with the native/stranger dichotomy is that the natives and 
strangers, by many accounts, actually have some things in common. What are 
those shared "things" becomes a crucial question. Murray G. Murphey, for 
example, has argued recently that cognitive and neuroscience provide a founda-
tion for our confidence that people (who share human physiology) can understand 
one another's commonsense knowledge across space and time.33 In cultural 
studies, the internationalization of certain sorts of commodity cultures in Late 
Capitalism means that many of us on the earth are "natives" of that cultural 
system, such that my commonsense world might resemble Lyotard's more than 
it resembles Cotton Mather's. 
A third problem with my bold axiom is that it can be taken as supporting the 
notion that only those critics with certain kinds of life experiences can analyze 
with any authority certain sorts of cultural texts. I reject that notion. I teach and 
write about lots of texts created out of circumstances in which I would be the 
stranger. But these are also public texts that, by their very existence in the public 
sphere, invite the relative stranger's connection and understanding. There are 
jokes in an African American friendship group that I would not "get," but I do 
"get" the contemporary urban legends in the African American community and 
I can get meaning from a Zora Neale Hurston novel.34 
There are other problems with my axiom, but this list is long enough for the 
reader to wonder why I still hold it. It is precisely the problems that it raises that 
make it such an interesting axiom to me. I recall being absolutely stunned in a 
graduate American Civilization seminar at the University of Pennsylvania when 
Anthony N.B. Garvan said nonchalantly that cultures should only be analyzed 
with the theories—the ethnosciences—that belonged to the culture. That radical 
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view seemed to me to take away a whole arsenal of theory we were learning in 
graduate school. (Professor Garvan, sir, aren't we using anthropologist A.I. 
Hallowell' s theory and language to try to understand the Puritans?) But Garvan's 
point, of course (I think), was that the historian or culture critic finally had to find 
some way to understand the culture through its own common sense, itself a 
dynamic cultural system. 
It is possible that this axiom is merely an elaborate (some might say tortured) 
justification for my own preference for theory arising out of the American 
pragmatic tradition, and that I should simply announce this orientation as the 
foundation of my intellectual practices and move on.35 But I do want to persuade 
practitioners of American cultural studies that the American pragmatic tradition 
deserves a central role in our criticism. Cornel West, Giles Gunn, Richard 
Bernstein, John Patrick Diggins, and others will write slightly different genealo-
gies of this tradition, but what is basic to the tradition is a certain stance towards 
knowledge and toward the social uses of that knowledge.36 Sy mbolic interactionism, 
a truly original social theory, has its roots deep in pragmatism. Put most boldly, 
and I hope my colleague in French is listening, I would say that there is no insight 
in Critical Theory that one cannot find in William James or Thorsten Veblen. 
Now, in one sense it is true that there is rarely anything "new" in philosophy, but 
the nineteenth-century founders of pragmatism were developing a specific 
philosophy out of their lived experiences in American society. 
With this too-short defense of my claim for American theories for American 
experiences, I am prepared to offer my ten new axioms. These axioms are not 
meant to replace Gene Wise's ; indeed, already much of what I have said is an echo 
of his argument. I am adding another voice at another moment. 
SOME [NEW] ELEMENTARY AXIOMS 
FOR AN AMERICAN CULTUR[AL] STUDIES 
The first two axioms are cultural, that is, they posit views of the nature of 
culture and experience. 
1. CULTURE IS A DYNAMIC SYSTEM OF LEARNED CONTRACTS 
THAT ORGANIZES, EVEN BRIEFLY, THE SUBJECTIVE REALITIES OF 
INDIVIDUALS SO THAT THE INDIVIDUALS CAN INTERACT AS IF 
THEY UNDERSTOOD ONE ANOTHER. 
I complained above that cultural studies has an undertheorized understand-
ing of culture, so my first axiom attempts to define culture. This axiom embodies 
the culture theory of anthropologist Anthony F.C. Wallace, which I shall describe 
here, but it also incorporates Gene Wise's first four axioms, so it might be helpful 
to repeat those now: 
1. INQUIRERS IN AMERICAN CULTURE STUDIES 
SHOULD NOTLOOKFORFACTS IN EXPERIENCE, BUT 
FOR "DENSE" FACTS—facts which both reveal deeper 
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meanings inside themselves, and point outward to other facts, 
other ideas, other meanings.. . . 
2. IN AN ONGOING CULTURE, EXPERIENCES ARE 
INTERCONNECTED ONE WITH ANOTHER. A distinctive 
task of American Studies should be to trace those interconnec-
tions through cultural experience, connections which the com-
partmentalizing of knowledge into discrete academic disci-
plines has tended to obscure or block... . 
3. DESPITE MASSIVE INSTITUTIONAL PRESSURES 
TO SEE IT OTHERWISE, THE FIRST AND FINAL BASE 
OF AMERICAN CULTURE STUDIES MUST BE NOT IN 
THE DEPARTMENTS OF ACADEME, BUT IN ONGOING 
EXPERIENCES OUTSIDE.... 
4. HOWEVER MUCH WE ARE PROMPTED TO INTE-
GRATE, WE SHOULD REMEMBER THAT OURS IS A 
PLURALISTIC CULTURE, WITHMULTIPLE REALITIES 
FUNCTIONING ON A VARIETY OF DIFFERENT, OFTEN 
CONFLICTING LEVELS.37 
Naturally, I see these axioms as coming out of the pragmatic tradition, with 
their emphasis on experience, on connectedness, and on pluralism. But they are 
also consistent with a specific model of culture proposed by Anthony F.C. 
Wallace over thirty years ago in his book, Culture and Personality.38 It is a model 
that sometimes explicitly but usually implicitly entered the curriculum of the 
American Civilization Department at the University of Pennsylvania (where 
Wallace was profesor of anthropology), mainly through the teaching by Anthony 
N.B. Garvan and Murray G. Murphey.39 
Working against an anthropological tradition that viewed culture as a 
strategy for "the replication of uniformity," Wallace was interested in creating a 
model that would view culture as a strategy for "the organization of diversity." 
Since we don't have access to other individuals' internal states, we culture critics 
must satisfy ourselves by asking how unique individuals ever "organize them-
selves culturally into orderly, expanding, changing societies?"40 The primacy of 
this "how" question leads Wallace to see culture as socially constructed (usually 
tacitly) "policy" and "contract," which enables people to predict each other's 
behavior and to bring order to social life.41 Culture organizes diversity, but 
Wallace shows that it is not necessary that diverse people share the same "map" 
of the system in order for them to have orderly and somewhat predictable 
interactions. Indeed, Wallace argues that "cognitive nonsharing" is necessary for 
the building of more complex cultural systems. All that is necessary is that people 
who interact have learned the behavior appropriate to a contractual relationship.42 
Wallace's formulation makes it clear for us that culture is public, and that what 
is shared is a public set of formulaic contractural relationships "available" to 
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members of the society who must interact, either voluntarily or involuntarily. 
(Wallace neglects the sometimes involuntary nature of social interactions. More 
on this in a moment.) A useful way to think about this is Roger Abrahams' s point 
that folklore—that is, traditional, formulaic communications face-to-face— 
provides an acceptable "impersonal" way to comment indirectly on a situation or 
a person's behavior.43 The value of culture lies precisely in its public, traditional 
(customary), formulaic, "impersonal" character. 
The formulae provide a way, as my axiom says, for people to "interact as if 
they understand one another." The participants share knowledge of and some 
competence in enacting the formulae, but (as Wallace says) we can make no 
assumption from the interaction that the participants share values, meanings, or 
motives. The "motives" point is important because Wallace tends to neglect, as 
I said, the issue of involuntary interactions, which is a subset of interactions in 
which the power available to the participants is unequal. Older theories of "play," 
for example, held that people play voluntarily.44 Gregory Bateson's notion of 
"frame," on the other hand, shows us that the existence of an interaction between 
two people (e.g., the play frame) tells us only that the people have agreed to an 
implicit contract to behave according to the rules of the frame for as long as they 
sustain the frame; the existence of the interaction proves nothing about the 
motives of the participants or even whether the two participants "think" they are 
in the same frame.45 Participants may have different power in a frame, and as 
Erving Goffman's extension of frame analysis shows us, some people quite 
commonly use frames to manipulate others. As Goffman said, if we can under-
stand how the confidence artist creates and sustains a frame, then we will 
understand how all reality is socially constructed, threatened, and repaired.46 
I hope it is clear by now that this formulation of culture is fully consistent with 
the interest of cultural studies critics in the ways hegemony fails in complex, Late 
Capitalist societies. John Fiske thinks Gramsci's formulations work especially 
well in the United States because the notion of "consent" fits the data better than 
does the liberal, pluralist view of "consensus."47 Wallace's view of culture as 
"policy" and "contract" affirms that all we culture critics ever see is evidence of 
consent, not of consensus. Thus, the "manufacture of consent," as opposed to the 
manufacture of consensus, becomes a crucial critical question. How do people 
learn the public, formulaic models for interacting? What are the ways people can 
take power in those interactions? What is the role of folklore in learning the 
contracts and in learning ways to take power? What is the role of mass-mediated 
texts in learning the contracts and in learning ways to take power? These are the 
sorts of questions my formulation of culture lead me to ask. 
My second axiom about culture makes an important statement about the 
relationship between "private" and "public" cultures: 
2. ALL OF AN INDIVIDUAL'S KNOWLEDGE OF CULTURE IS LO-
CAL KNOWLEDGE. 
This axiom condenses many issues and has several important implications. 
Geertz introduced the notion of "local knowledge" by observing that "[t]o an 
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ethnographer, sorting through the machinery of distant ideas, the shapes of 
knowledge are always ineluctably local, indivisible from their instruments and 
their encasements."48 Wallace's understanding of culture necessarily means that 
the individual always enters cultural systems "locally," in direct encounters with 
actual or mass-mediated others. The individual "cooks" new experiences in "the 
sauce of the old." 
The next five axioms are methodological and strategic. 
3. LOOK FIRST TO THE BODY. 
For the pragmatist, the twin experiences of both having and being a body 
make the body a prime site for the creation of meaning.49 Beginning in the 1970s, 
Mary Douglas, Victor Turner, and other symbolic anthropologists taught us how 
cultures use the body as a metaphorical equivalent of the society.50 In Douglas's 
formulation, for example, the body's nature as a bounded system, with an inside 
and an outside and with "danger" zones where materials cross into the body (air, 
food, drink, semen) and out of it (excretions), makes the body a rich symbol for 
society, another bounded system with dangerous border crossings. I find Douglas's 
approach enormously useful in my writing and teaching.51 Similarly, sociolinguists 
George Lakoff and Mark Johnson have demonstrated the ways our bodies provide 
the experiential basis for "the metaphors we live by."52 Among other things, as 
Lévi-Strauss noted, the bilateral symmetry of the body may prompt humans to 
think in terms of binary oppositions.53 In short, in most cases culture criticism 
around a "dense fact" or dense text can profit from beginning with the body and 
from all of the methodological hunches that beginning can prompt. 
4. LISTEN TO THE SILENCES. 
Whenever I am puzzling over a cultural text for teaching or writing, I always 
find it profitable to ask what Peter Berger or Mary Douglas or Gregory Bateson 
might say about the text. Bateson was very interested in the ways cybernetics and 
information theory might contribute to anthropological and psychological under-
standings, and he defined "information" as "news of a difference" and an "idea" 
as a "difference that makes a difference." A subtle point he made in writing about 
information, however, was that the event that doesn' t happen—his example is the 
letter we expect to receive and don't—also provides information, news of a 
difference.54 Other wise people, like Adrienne Rich, have reminded us to "listen 
for the silences" in order to learn some important things about the workings of 
culture.55 One way this principle manifests itself methodologically is for the critic 
to ask, "what could have happened here and didn't?" It was brilliant for Janice 
Radway to ask her informants for Reading the Romance to name some "failed" 
romances they have read and to articulate what is missing from a failed romance.56 
I often give this advice to students—ask your informants what would constitute 
a "failed" version of this experience. What should have happened and didn't? 
5. IF YOU GET IN A MUDDLE, TRY MOVING UP ONE LEVEL OF 
LOGICAL TYPE. 
This is pure Bateson again.57 His idea of the frame draws upon Russell and 
Whitehead's Theory of Logical Types, best understood through Bateson's 
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description of the play frame. In order for two mammals to play, they have to 
exchange and agree to a communciation that establishes the frame, "this is play," 
such that the participants understand that the ensuing messages (communication, 
behavior) are to be interpreted according to the "rules" known to govern the 
"metamessage" (a message about other messages), "this is play." The peculiar 
paradox of play, as Bateson puts it, is that the actions in the play frame (e.g., a 
playfight) do not mean what they would mean if another meta-message (e.g., "this 
is a fight") framed the interaction 
The idea of the frame leads in many interesting directions, among them 
Bateson's double-bind theory of schizophrenia and a very useful understanding 
of creativity.58 Among the methodological lessons is the one named in this 
axiom—namely, that if one gets in a muddle puzzling through the meanings of 
a text, stepping up a level of logical type, from the class of texts to the class of 
classes of texts, often provides clarity. This sounds more difficult than it is in 
practice. My favorite example comes from the experience of an American Studies 
senior who was attempting to write a senior thesis in the early 1970s about Native 
American suicide. The more sources she consulted, the more confused she 
became. The whole category "Native American suicide" became problematic, as 
some claimed that the numbers were artifacts of carelessness and biases in Anglo 
bureaucratic practices, others claimed that all Native American "suicides" were 
really murders, still others claimed that death by alcoholism must be counted as 
a suicide, and so on. She solved her problem when she realized that her topic was 
not Native American suicide but discourse about Native American suicide. 
The ability to move competently and comfortably between levels of logical 
type is a necessary quality for the individual who would play, which leads 
naturally to my next axiom: 
6. PLAY WITH THE DISCOURSE 
The interdisciplinary cognitive style (which characterizes the "American 
studies type," as Richard Dorson called us) values "play" with ideas. Gene Wise 
acknowledged the importance of play in his tenth and final axiom: "SCHOLAR-
SHIP IS A SERIOUS BUSINESS, BUT WE MUST REMIND OURSELVES 
THAT 'PLAY' OF MIND AS WELL AS WORK OF MIND IS NECESSARY 
TO UNDERSTANDING. BESIDES, IT IS HEALTHIER!"59 Amen. 
Stan Bailis is particularly forceful in describing interdisciplinary thinking as 
a game, as "the game."60 The critic who would play the game must be adept at the 
subjunctive, "as if," mood of play. Sometimes the game is to think about a cultural 
phenomenon "as i f one were a sociologist of a certain type, let's say, or "as i f 
the gender or race of the participants were changed, or "as i f this text were like 
that one. My favorite example comes from The Arts in Modern American 
Civilization, where John Kowenhoven quotes Le Courbusier's exclamation, 
upon seeing New York's skyscrapers, that they were "hot jazz in steel and stone." 
Kouwenhoven poses and tries to answer this quintessential sort of American 
Studies question: how is jazz music like a skyscraper? 
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7. ESCHEW OBFUSCATION. 
This axiom appeared first as a humorous bumpersticker, probably in the late 
1960s. It would make a nice poster for academic offices and studies. An 
increasing number of culture critics, both in print and orally, have taken some 
version of the pledge to write clearly and simply. As bell hooks puts it, "my 
decisions about writing style, about not using conventional academic formats, are 
political decisions motivated by the desire to be inclusive, to reach as many 
readers as possible in as many locations. This decision has had consquences both 
positive and negative."61 
The last three axioms are pedagogical.62 
8. RESPECT YOUR STUDENTS' KNOWLEDGE. 
In their interesting book, Women's Ways of Knowing, Belenky and her 
colleagues notice that women's experience with the male-defined college class-
room, especially in science courses, very often gets framed something like this: 
"You cannot trust the ways you have learned to know things. Cast those old ways 
aside. I will teach you how to know things."63 Whether one wishes to accept or 
argue with the authors' argument that women's everyday epistemology is 
different from men's, I think we can easily recognize that male and female 
students alike often experience the meta-message, "you don't know anything 
worthwhile, so I am here to teach you." 
The great pleasure of teaching folklore and popular culture is that students 
do know lots that is worthwhile. Students already know folklore, from the 
everyday conversational genres of proverbs, charms, and jokes to the more 
elaborate genres, such as urban legends. In the cases of popular culture, such as 
the latest sorts of music, the students easily might know a great deal more than the 
teacher. What the students lack is a set of ideas and a vocabulary for making 
"strange" this all-too-familiar cultural discourse. The teacher helps them leam 
how to distance themselves from the "natural attitude," from the everyday, 
commonsensical understanding of the discourse to understanding the important 
psychological and social work the discourse is doing. As a teacher of folklore and 
popular culture, I find it does wonders for the classroom that the students can teach 
me certain things, and I can teach them certain things. 
What this amounts to is "cognitive respect."64 Cognitive disrespect causes 
great mischief, both in society and in the classroom. Approaching students as if 
they have "false consciousness" that I, the teacher, am about to set straight doesn't 
get very far, in my view. 
This reminds me of a story. I teach regularly in our Integrated Studies 
Program, a residential honors program for about seventy first-year students. In the 
Fall, we give them an additional ten-week series of lectures around a theme, and 
a few years ago the theme was "Discrimination." Guest lecturers sailed through, 
each talking about discrimination from a particular disciplinary point of view (I 
lectured about racism, sexism, and homophobia in folklore). For their one unit 
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(Pass/No Pass), students had to write an essay responding to the question, "What 
is the most serious kind of discrimination at UCDavis and what do you think can 
be done to alleviate it?" The half dozen or so faculty members who read the essays 
(I had not volunteered) exploded when a large number of students named "reverse 
discrimination" as the most serious problem. One faculty member wanted to 
flunk them all, but the faculty readers agreed, finally, to let the students rewrite 
the essay. 
Politically conservative teachers and citizens will find in this story an 
instance of "political correctness" run amuck, but that position holds the indefen-
sible proposition that there are courses that are not "political," that do not coerce 
students into thinking about (or, better, pretending to think about) a topic in a 
particular way. Rather, I see a lesson in this story for the progressive teacher. It 
was not surprising at all to me that so many students chose "reverse discrimina-
tion" as their target; indeed, I imagine a few dozen others would have said so if 
they had the nerve. These students were writing about a social situation of which 
they had direct experience. Many Euroamerican and Asian American students at 
Davis had Berkeley (a mere 70 miles down Interstate-80) as their first choice. 
These students also know that there were high school classmates with lower SAT 
scores and lower GPAs who did get into Berkeley. They know this; no amount of 
lecturing at them with pieties about racism, sexism, classism, and heterosexism 
in American society will undo what they know from direct experience. 
The progressive pedagogical answer is not to raise our voices at them. The 
pedagogical challenge is to take what these students know, and what other 
students (say, students of color or gay/lesbian/bisexual students) know, show 
respect toward their knowedge and the experiences generating that knowledge, 
and then move to contextualize and complexify what the students and teachers 
"know." Why do students value a UC Berkeley degree over a UC Davis degree, 
when, by many accounts, a students can get a better, more attentive undergraduate 
education at Davis than at Berkeley? That simple question can lead to others 
probing the entire political, social, economic, and historical context for UC 
admission practices. This event happened before the historic UC Regents vote 
(summer of 1995) to eliminate affirmative action in admissions and hiring 
practices, and that vote has prompted a necessary conversation about the history 
of discrimination and of the present state of racial, class, and gender bias in the 
society. 
I do not have easy answers to the pedagogical problem I have posed, nor am 
I certain how I would reconstruct that lecture series if I had the opportunity. But 
I do know that I would not understand "what went wrong" in that course without 
following the axiom that I must respect the knowledge of students. If I had any 
chance of "teaching" them away from a simple, naturalized attitude toward 
affirmative action programs, that chance depended on their confidence that I 
respected their knowledge and experiences. 
There is an important political and ethical question here, one we teachers 
should address. Is my goal of "changing" the student a form of disrespect toward 
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the student, especially in an academic climate in which an increasing number of 
students assert a "right" not to be changed by their university education? Put 
differently, what the liberal, pluralist teacher sees as a sign of the "mature" 
intellect, making problematic all the certainties students hold, some students see 
as an assault on their values and beliefs. Hence the salience of the "political 
correctness" debate on campuses. My ninth axiom is my response to this 
dilemma: 
9. TEACH AMERICAN CULTURAL STUDIES AS A MODEL OF 
MORAL DISCOURSE IN A LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY; WE CAN 
AND SHOULD MAKE JUDGMENTS ABOUT BETTER AND WORSE 
WAYS TO LIVE TOGETHER. 
This axiom sounds the most dangerous, because it speaks to the most 
troubling implications of "the linguistic turn" in philosophy and cultural studies. 
To explain this dangerous axiom, I must write autobiographically for a moment. 
I was an American Studies major at a small, church-affiliated liberal arts 
university in the mid-1960s, and although I wasn't terribly religious at the time, 
I appreciated the fact that my courses were taught under a broader canopy of 
values questions. American Studies felt like a comfortable home, in retrospect, 
because it was a Utopian "social movement" and, as such, resembled a religious 
movement. As Robert Berkhofer noted, American Studies in those years was very 
American in its sense of "mission" and in its Utopian sense that we could work 
against the compartmentalization and rationalist neutrality of the university. My 
graduate education in American Civilization at the University of Pennsylvania 
lacked the religious canopy, but it still had a strong sense of mission. When I 
arrived at Davis in 1971, Robert Merideth had brought his radical politics to the 
program a year earlier, and the "American Culture Studies" essay he, David S. 
Wilson, and I wrote out of that first year of conversations has plenty of Utopian 
vision, I think. We three became active in the Radical Caucus (later the Connec-
tions Collective) of the American Studies Association and worked actively to 
create a curriculm and classroom practices that enacted on a small scale the 
Utopian transformation of the university.65 
As I read through the work of sociologist Peter L. Berger, I came to appreciate 
the ways one might strike a balance between detached culture criticism and 
normative judgment. Berger looks to Weber and to Reinhold Niebuhr for 
guidance on this balancing act, and I especially value Niebuhr's view that we must 
go ahead and act in the world, knowing all the while that there might be 
unintended consequences of our acts. Such is the tragedy of human action. 
William James offers similar advice, noting that we are faced often with "forced 
options" that require us to act without full knowledge; it is easy to see Niebuhr and 
Berger as working out of the American pragmatic tradition.66 
Rorty nicely addresses this dilemma, of course. Much of Rorty's writing 
aims at explaining why the pragmatic understanding of knowledge and truth does 
not lead to moral relativism, but I especially like his description of himself as one 
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of the "liberal ironists"—i.e., "people who combined commitment with a sense 
of the contingency of their own commitment"—and his critique of Foucault "as 
an ironist who is unwilling to be a liberal" and of Habermas as "a liberal who is 
unwilling to be an ironist."67 Rorty's description of the liberal ironist seems to fit 
my own attitude and work. 
Teaching as a liberal ironist means that I explain to students that there are 
distinct "moments" in cultural criticism. One "moment" consists of the radical 
deconstruction of all knowledge and "truth" as socially constructed, discovering 
the ideological dimensions of the most familiar and naturalized discourse. But I 
consider it intellectually and morally irresponsible to leave students dangling in 
that moment. That critical act must be toward some desirable end, some vision of 
a society in which we would all want to live. So complete the critical act, I tell 
students, by entering the second "moment," in which you make a normative 
judgment about the knowledge you have created through your critical practices.68 
Just keep a sense of liberal irony about your decision. 
Rorty's liberal irony is not to be confused with the ironic stance named in 
most definitions of postmodernism. The postmodern ironic stance too often 
resembles cynicism and nihilism, a "cool stance" whose pleasures are fleeting and 
dehumanizing. Moreover, as some feminist critics have noted, postmodern irony 
may make for poor politics.69 
10. TEACHING IS IMPORTANT CULTURAL WORK, POTENTIALLY 
TRANSFORMING WORK, SO DON'T APOLOGIZE FOR IT; BUT TEACH-
ING AND OTHER SORTS OF WORK FOR SOCIAL, RACIAL, AND ECO-
NOMIC JUSTICE ARE NOT MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE, SO SAVE SOME 
OF YOUR TIME, TALENT, AND TREASURE FOR OTHER WAYS TO 
MAKE A DIFFERENCE IN THE WORLD. 
There is now a (to me) tiresome debate in cultural studies about whether 
teaching from the safety and comfort of a tenured position "counts" as radical 
practice. There was an earlier version of this debate when the focus was on the 
claims by John Fiske and others advocating audience-response criticism that 
audiences have a certain sort of "power" in their interpretive practices, a power 
to resist certain readings of texts and to substitute their own readings against the 
grain. A poignant moment in this debate was Todd Gitlin' s complaint that calling 
both "channel-surfing" and standing in front of a tank in Tienanmen Square 
"cultural resistance" makes the phrase mean nothing.70 Lately, and somewhat in 
response to the political right's successful use of "political correctness" as a 
weapon in the culture wars, the debate in cultural studies has been over misspent 
energies and false notions about what counts as radical praxis. 
My axiom simply asserts that teaching does count as a respectable radical (or 
liberal ironic) practice. Cultural studies critics like bell hooks and Henry Giroux 
make cogent arguments for the difference this pedagogy can make, but we should 
not accept the false forced choice between teaching as a radical acivity and other 
sorts of work toward transforming the culture. Fundraising in religious and in not-
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for-profit organizations has settled on some version of the "time, talent, and 
treasure" formula for describing the three sorts of gifts the volunteer can give an 
organization. American Cultural Studies teachers do not have to see the class-
room or the printed page as their only venues for progressive, transformative 
practices. 
Conclusion 
It was with great nervousness that I embarked on this experiment of 
"updating" Gene Wise's ten "Axioms for an American Culture Studies." The 
1979 essay works perfectly well as orienting advice as we approach the century's 
end. Still, following Gene's advice, I thought it important to articulate my own 
scholarly and teaching practices, especially as the disciplinary landscape has 
changed somewhat and "cultural studies" is all the rage. I am not sure what Gene 
Wise would say today if he were here to revise his essay. I do not think he would 
see cultural studies as a competitive threat to American Culture Studies. I think 
he would be pleased to see "culture" as the center of our criticism and to see that 
C. Wright Mills's dictum—namely, that the function of social criticism is to 
"connect private troubles with public issues"—now seems so natural to the 
community of American Cultur[al] Studies practitioners.711 know I am. 
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